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THE ROLE OF TREBLE DAMAGES IN
LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL ATTEMPTS TO
DETER INSIDER TRADING
Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act)' to provide
for protection of the investor in capital markets. 2 The '34 Act created the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)3 to oversee and enforce federal
securities legislation.4 Among the practices that the SEC seeks to deter as harm-
ful to the fairness and integrity of the securities exchanges is the trading of
securities by one who possesses material5 nonpublic information.6 The insider
trading sanctions, therefore, focus primarily on stock transactions by
directors, managers, and controlling shareholders who possess nonpublic in-
formation likely to affect a reasonable investor's decision to trade. 7 Section
I. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982)) ('34 Act).
2. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 10 (1934), reprinted in 5 J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR, LEGISLATIvE HISTORY OF THE
SEcurrms ACT OF 1933 AND SEcuRITrEs ExcoANGE ACT OF 1934, items 17, 18 (1973) ('34 Act
seeks to insure fair and honest markets for investors). Congress intended the '34 Act to deter
the speculative practices that led to the stock market crash of 1929. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934) (unfair speculation caused loss to investors); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 ('34 Act seeks to correct prior abuses of stock markets).
3. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1982) (establishing Securities and Exchange Commission)(SEC).
The SEC consists of five commissioners appointed by the President with the advice and consent
of the Senate. Id. § 78d(a). The commissioners may appoint other officers, attorneys, examiners,
and other experts to assist in carrying out the functions of the SEC. Id. § 78d(b).
4. See id. § 78w (SEC has power to make rules and regulations to implement '34 Act).
Congress foresaw the need for flexibility in the interpretation and enforcement of the '34 Act,
and determined that vesting these powers in an administrative agency would fulfill that need.
See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1934) (SEC's administrative discretion avoids
problems of rigid statutory regulation).
5. See TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (materiality means infor-
mation that would be significant in investor's deliberations); SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47,
49 (1st Cir. 1983) (en banc) (materiality means information that reasonable shareholder would
consider important).
6. See S. REp. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934) ('34 Act protects investors from
insider speculation on nonpublic information); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934)
('34 Act seeks to control unfair practices of corporate insiders). Congress determined that the
practice of insider trading was a flagrant betrayal of fiduciary duties. See S. REP. No. 1455,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934), reprinted in 5 J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE SEcuRTIES ACT OF 1933 AND SEctnuTIs EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, item 21 (1973) (insider
trading is unfair).
7. See S. REp. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934) (directors, officers, and large
stockholders have unique opportunities to acquire and abuse inside information); S. REP. No.
792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934) ('34 Act protects public interest by preventing officers, direc-
tors, and principal stockholders from speculating on nonpublic information); H. REP. No. 1383,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934) ('34 Act seeks to curtail abuse of inside information by corporate
officers, directors, and controlling shareholders). The SEC has expanded the definition of an
insider to include anyone in a fiduciary relationship with the company who gains access to inside
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168 of the '34 Act, for example, requires corporate directors, officers, and
holders of ten percent or more of a company's shares to surrender to the cor-
poration any profits that accrue from purchases and sales of the company's
stock occurring within a six month period.' Additionally, section 10(b)10 of
the '34 Act and SEC rule 10b-511 provide a broad prohibition against
fraudulent, deceptive, and manipulative practices including insider trading.'
2
Congress empowered the SEC with several means of implementing the
insider trading prohibitions.' 3 A widely used SEC enforcement tool is the civil
information by virtue of the relationship. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912
(1961) (insider trading prohibitions not limited to officers, directors, and controlling stockholders).
Subsequent court decisions have extended insider trading liability to persons who trade on material
nonpublic information received from corporate directors, officers, or controlling shareholders.
See, e.g., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 165 (2d Cir. 1980) (both tippers and
tippees violate rule lob-5 by trading on nonpublic information); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d 228, 235-36 (2d Cir. 1974) (trading on nonpublic information received
from corporate insider violated § 10(b) and rule lOb-5). See generally Brudney, Insiders, Out-
siders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARv. L. Rxv. 322,
348 (1979) (recipient of inside information inherits insider's duty to disclose or refrain from trading).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1982).
9. Id.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982) ('34 Act, § 10(b)). Section 10(b) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the malls, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange . ..
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commissioner may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors.
Id.
11. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983). Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange, (a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) to engage in any act, practice,
or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
12. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (§
10b and rule lOb-5 prohibit insider trading), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971). The Texas Gulf
Sulphur court enunciated the "disclose or abstain" rule, which states that an insider must disclose
inside information or abstain from trading. See id.; see also In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C.
907, 911 (1961) (insiders must disclose before trading or forego transaction).
13. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1982) (SEC can seek injunctions against violations); id. § 780-3
(SEC can discipline broker-dealers who violate '34 Act); id. § 78u(a) (SEC can investigate insider
trading violations and publish findings). The '34 Act subjects violators to possible criminal fines
of up to $10,000 and maximum five year prison terms. See id. § 78ff(a) (criminal penalties).
The SEC can recommend criminal prosecution by transmitting evidence of violations to the United
States Attorney General. Id. § 78u(d).
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injunctive suit.' 4 In addition to the SEC's specific statutory enforcement powers,
courts have implied a private right of action against inside traders under sec-
tion 10(b) and rule lOb-5.' 5 Despite the efforts of the SEC and private plain-
tiffs, however, insider trading continues to flourish.16 Since the present statutory
provisions and implied private action provide little deterrent effect,'" Con-
gress currently is considering a proposed amendment to the '34 Act that would
strengthen the SEC's power to deter insider trading.'" The Insider Trading
Sanctions Act (ITSA)'9 would authorize the SEC to seek treble damages from
inside traders in addition to the SEC's current injunctive powers.2"
14. See id. § 78u(d) (SEC injunctive suits). To obtain injunctive relief against violators,
the SEC must prove the occurrence of a past violation and show that future violations are reasonably
likely. See SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. See., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 100 (2d Cir. 1978) (SEC must
demonstrate realistic likelihood that past violations will recur). The statutory authority for SEC
injunctions, however, relieves the SEC of the normal civil burden of showing irreparable harm
to obtain an injunction. See 15 U.S.C. 78u(d) (1982) (statutory injunctive authority); SEC v.
Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 808 (2d Cir. 1975) (public interest in SEC enforce-
ment of securities laws justifies injunctive relief without showing of irreparable harm).
15. See, e.g., Herman &MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S.Ct. 683, 690 (1983) (implied private
action under § 10(b) survives despite availability of express remedies); Superintendent of Ins.
v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) (Supreme Court recognized § 10(b) private
right of action); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 96 & n.7 (10th Cir. 1971)
(federal circuits recognize private right of action under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5, cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1004 (1971); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (federal
district court first recognized § 10(b) implied private right of action); Note, Conflict Resolved:
An Implied Remedy Under Section 10(b) of the '34 Act Survives Despite the Existence of Express
Remedies, 40 WAsH. & LEE L. Rnv. 1039, 1049 & n.6 (1983) (discussion of background of § 10(b)
and rule lab-5 private rights of action). The SEC has endorsed the implied private right of action
as a needed supplemental deterrent to insider trading. See Brief for the Securities and Exchange
Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of Partial Affirmance at 6, Herman & MacLean v.
Huddleston, 103 S.Ct. 683 (1983) (limited enforcement resources of SEC make private right of
action vital to effective enforcement of § 10(b)).
16. See Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange Commission in Support of the In-
sider Trading Sanctions Act, H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 21, 21 (1983) (insider
trading continues despite vigorous enforcement efforts) [hereinafter cited as SEC Memorandum].
Congress has noted that insider trading practices have become more frequent in recent years due
to an increase in the number of mergers and tender offers which can cause the price of a target
company's stock to fluctuate dramatically. See H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1983)
(immense profit potential in mergers and tender offers is powerful lure to inside traders); see
also Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REv. 1, 1 (1980) (sharp
increase in trading of target company shares before announcements of impending mergers or
takeovers indicates presence of insider trading).
17. See H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1983) (existing remedies provide inade-
quate deterrent to insider trading); SEC Memorandum, supra note 16, at 24 (current insider trading
remedies have insufficient deterrent effect).
18. See infra note 20 and text accompanying notes 19-20 (discussion of Insider Trading
Sanctions Act (ITSA)).
19. H.R. 559, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983).
20. Id. § 2. In addition to authorizing the SEC to seek treble damages for insider trading
violations, ITSA would increase the current maximum criminal fine from $10,000 to $100,000.
Id. § 3; see supra note 13 (discussion of '34 Act criminal penalties). The sponsors of ITSA pointed
out that inflation has diminished the deterrent impact of the $10,000 fine set in 1934. See H.R.
REp. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1983) (1983 dollar has one-seventh of 1934 value).
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In SEC civil injunctive actions, section 21(e)2 of the '34 Act authorizes
the SEC to seek injunctions to prevent violations of the Act. 22 Although the
language of the statute authorizes only injunctive relief, courts also have
employed their equity powers to fashion appropriate remedies in each case.23
An effective remedy involves disgorgement of any financial benefit, by which
a court can deprive a defendant of any profits gained or losses avoided.by
the unlawful conduct.24 Courts, however, have differed on how to measure
the disgorgement remedy in SEC enforcement proceedings.
25
In SEC v. Shapiro,2 6 the Second Circuit required an inside trader to
disgorge all "paper" profits accruing from an insider trade, even though the
holding resulted in the defendant having to surrender a greater sum of money
than he actually made on the transaction. 27 In Shapiro, defendant Berman
periodically purchased shares in Harvey's Stores, Inc. (Harvey's) during
negotiations for a profitable merger between Harvey's and another
corporation. 28 The price of Harvey's shares rose significantly after public
disclosure of the merger negotiations, and Berman sold portions of his holdings
at a profit. 29 The proposed merger failed to occur, however, and the price
of the Harvey's shares declined.30 Berman sold the remainder of his Harvey's
stock at prices lower than the price at which he had purchased some of the
shares.3 The Second Circuit affirmed a district court order requiring Berman
to pay to a trustee the difference between the peak price and the purchase
price of the shares, even though Berman had to pay more money than he
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1982).
22. Id.; see supra note 14 (description of SEC injunctive powers).
23. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391 (1970) (Congress did not intend
'34 Act to restrict courts' power to fashion appropriate relief); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers,
Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1103-04 (2d Cir. 1972) (showing of securities violation properly invokes
equity jurisdiction to fashion appropriate remedies); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d
1301, 1307 (2d Cir.) (Supreme Court has upheld lower courts' power to grant ancilliary relief
in absence of specific statutory authority), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1982) ('34 Act grants exclusive law and equity jurisdiction to federal district courts for '34 Act
violations).
24. See, e.g., SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978) (disgorgement deprives
wrongdoer of ill-gotten gains); SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d
Cir. 1978) (disgorgement is method of forcing defendant to surrender unjust enrichment); SEC
v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104 (2d Cir. 1972) (courts' discretion to compel
disgorgement adds to deterrent effect of SEC enforcement). Courts do not exceed disgorgement
because § 28(a) of the '34 Act precludes punitive damages. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982) (§
24(a) of '34 Act) (recoveries limited to actual damages).
25. See Brunelle, Disgorgement of Insider Trading Profits in SEC Injunctive Proceedings,
11 SEc. REG. L.J. 371, 373 (1984) (federal courts have exhibited dramatic disagreement over
measurement of disgorgement remedy in SEC actions); infra text accompanying notes 26-54 (discus-
sion of different views on measuring disgorgement remedy in SEC actions).
26. 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974).
27. See id. at 1309.
28. Id. at 1303-05.





actually made by selling shares after the price declined. 2 The Shapiro court
reasoned that to require disgorgement only of actual profits might encourage
insider trading by emasculating the deterrent effect of rule lOb-5.3
In contrast to the Shapiro decision, the First Circuit in SEC v. MacDonald
3
4
required an inside trader to disgorge a sum of money smaller than the defen-
dant's actual profit.3 In MacDonald, defendant MacDonald purchased shares
in a real estate investment trust of which he was a trustee.3 6 MacDonald pur-
chased the shares while in possession of nonpublic knowledge of a major prop-
erty acquisition and profitable lease 'egotiation by the trust.3 After public
disclosure of the information, the stock price rose significantly for a week
before settling at a new high." MacDonald held the stock for two more years,
however, before selling at an even higher price. 39 The SEC obtained a disgorge-
ment order requiring MacDonald to surrender the difference between the pur-
chase price and the price at which MacDonald sold the shares. 40 A divided
First Circuit reversed the disgorgement order, however, and held that Mac-
Donald should have to disgorge only the difference between the purchase price
and the price the shares attained within a reasonable time after public disclosure
of the information. 4' The MacDonald court reasoned that defrauded
shareholders could have mitigated their losses by repurchasing shares after
public disclosure of the favorable information. 42 The MacDonald court ex-
32. Id. at 1309.
33. Id.
34. 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983) (en banc).
35. See id. at 55; infra text accompanying notes 36-44 (discussion of MacDonald decision).
36. 699 F.2d at 48.
37. Id. In MacDonald, Realty Income Trust (RIT) owned the land beneath the Kroger
building, a 25-story office building in Cincinnati, Ohio. Id. RIT acquired the Kroger building
after the previous owner defaulted on mortgage payments. Id. Prior to default, however, the
owner had been negotiating a profitable long-term lease of vacant office space with a prospective
new tenant. Id. RIT continued the lease negotiations after acquiring the building. Id.
38. Id. at 49.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 48.
41. Id. at 55. In an en banc hearing, the First Circuit decided the disgorgement issue in
MacDonald. See id. at 52 n.3 (SEC filed for rehearing en banc on damages issue). The Mac-
Donald majority instructed the district court on remand to consider the price and volume at
which RIT shares traded following disclosure of the inside information. Id. at 55. The Mac-
Donald court surmised that a temporary leveling off of the postdisclosure rise in price would
indicate the time at which the market had adjusted to the new information. Id. The MacDonald
court concluded that the leveling off period before the price of the shares rose to the level at
which MacDonald finally sold would be the proper time at which to measure MacDonald's damages.
Id.
The MacDonald dissent argued in favor of full disgorgement of the difference between
the purchase price and the price at which MacDonald sold the shares. See id. at 55-58 (Coffin,
C.J., dissenting in part) (defendant should relinquish fruits of wrongdoing). The dissent stressed
that full disgorgement was necessary to provide a deterrent to insider trading and to preserve
the integrity of the securities markets. See id. at 55 (public policy justifies full disgorgement);
id. at 56 (partial disgorgement is inadequate deterrent).
42. Id. at 53; see Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1306 n.27 (2d Cir. 1973)
(defrauded sellers should mitigate damages by repurchasing shares after discovering fraud).
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plained that an insider's decision to retain illegally acquired shares for further
profits was no different from the insider's opportunity to sell for immediate
profit and reinvest in something else.13 The First Circuit held, therefore, that
subsequent profits after the share price had responded to disclosure of inside
information were beyond the reach of a court's equitable power to compel
disgorgement."'
One court has rejected entirely the mere disgorgement of profits remedy
as being an inadequate deterrent to insider trading.4 5 In SEC v. Randolph,"
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California re-
fused to endorse a consent judgment for injunctive relief and disgorgement
of profits in an SEC enforcement action. 7 In Randolph, defendant Randolph
tipped nonpublic information concerning a corporate takeover to Randolph's
father-in-law, who profited by trading in options for the target company's
shares." Randolph agreed with the SEC to disgorge profits from the options
transactions and not to violate the securities laws in the future. 49 When the
SEC requested the district court to sign the consent decree and enter final
judgment, however, the court refused.50 The Randolph court stated that the
purpose of the securities laws is to deter unlawful conduct. 5' Criticizing mere
disgorgement as having no deterrent effect,52 the Randolph court dismissed
the case, concluding that the SEC at least should have sought to recover in-
terest on the illegal profits.13 The Randolph court declared that anything less
would not be in the public interest.
5 4
43. 699 F.2d at 54.
44. Id.; see SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978) (disgorgement power is remedial
not punitive and extends only to amounts attributable to wrongdoing); cf. SEC v. Manor Nursing
Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104 (2d Cir. 1972) (disgorgement of income earned on illegal pro-
fits was error).
45. See infra text accompanying notes 46-54 (discussion of SEC. v. Randolph).
46. 564 F. Supp. 137 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
47. Id. at 138.
48. Id. at 138-39.
49. Id. at 139.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 140-41. The Randolph court stressed the importance of deterrence in SEC actions,
stating that any compensation purpose should apply only to private actions. Id. at 141; see List
v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.) (rule lob-5 administrative proceedings seek
to deter misconduct rather than compensate victims), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); Ellsworth,
Disgorgement in Securities Fraud Actions Brought by the SEC, 1977 DuKE L.J. 641, 649-51 (1977)
(SEC disgorgement remedy is solely deterrent device).
52. See 564 F. Supp. at 141 (mere disgorgement is no deterrent to insider who must restore
only illegal gain if caught).
53. Id. at 144; see SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 55 (1st Cir. 1983) (assessment of pre-
judgment interest on disgorged profits is appropriate); Elldnd v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d
156, 173 n.30 (2d Cir. 1980) (awarding prejudgment interest is within court's discretion); SEC
v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978) (court's disgorgement power includes assessment
of interest on disgorged profits).
54. 564 F. Supp. at 144; see id. at 141 (court must consider whether proposed settlement
is fair to public). In addition to the inadequacy of the mere disgorgement remedy as grounds
for dismissal of the SEC's suit, the Randolph court declared that the SEC could enforce the
consent agreement with the defendant on ordinary contract principles, rendering any judicial
approval unnecessary. Id. at 144.
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Similarly, courts considering private actions have exhibited disagreement
over how to measure the disgorgement remedy." The Second Circuit held for
the first time in Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.56 that
an inside trader could be liable to private plaintiffs who purchased shares on
an impersonal stock exchange. 57 In Shapiro, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., (Merrill Lynch) was the managing underwriter for a proposed
bond offering by Douglas Aircraft Corp. (Douglas).58 During the course of
this relationship, Merrill Lynch learned that Douglas soon would announce
a decrease in earnings that contrasted with an earlier declaration anticipating
favorable earnings. 9 Merrill Lynch disclosed this inside information to selected
customers who sold large blocks of Douglas shares on the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE). 60 The plaintiffs in Shapiro purchased Douglas shares on
the NYSE just before the unfavorable earnings announcement. 6 After
disclosure of the decrease in Douglas' earnings, the plaintiffs sued Merrill Lynch
and the selling customers for violation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.62 The
Second Circuit held that the defendants owed a duty to all Douglas shareholders
who bought during the time that the defendants were selling either to disclose
the information or refrain from trading. 63 The Shapiro court determined that
sufficient causation existed to justify imposing liability on the defendants since
the plaintiffs would not have bought the Douglas shares if the plaintiffs had
known the information. 64 The court declared that this holding was consistent
55. See Note, A New Measure of Damages for Tippee-Trading Violations Under Rule lOb-5:
Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rv. 407, 407 (1981) (damages measure is least
formulated aspect of § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 actions) [hereinafter cited as New Measure of Damages];
Note, Damages for Insider Trading Violations in an Impersonal Market Context, 7 J. CoRP.
L. 97, 107-10 (1981) (discussion of three damages measures considered by Fikind court) [hereinafter
cited as Impersonal Market Context]; Comment, Measure of Damages for Insider Trading: Elkind
v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 56 ST. Join's L. Ray. 142, 143 & n.6 (1981) (measure of damages
is uncertain because settling defendants allow few courts to reach damages issue [hereinafter cited
as Measure of Damages]; Note, The Measure of Damages in Rule 10b-5 Cases Involving Actively
Traded Securities, 26 STAN. L. Ray. 371, 371 (1974) (courts use variety of methods to determine
damages amount). See generally 5B A. JAcoBs, THm ImAcT oF RuLE 1OB-5 (rev. ed. 1980) (com-
prehensive study of remedies in rule lOb-5 cases); Mullaney, Theories of Measuring Damages
in Security Cases and the Effects of Damages on Liability, 46 FopDHAm L. REv. 277, 281-94
(1977) (discussion of developing law of damages in rule 10b-5 cases).
56. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
57. Id. at 241; see Note, New Measure of Damages, supra note 55, at 407 (Merrill Lynch
established right of action for uninformed outsiders).
58. 495 F.2d at 231.
59. Id. at 231-32.
60. Id. at 232. In Merrill Lynch, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith (Merrill Lynch)
disclosed nonpublic information concerning Douglas Aircraft Corp.'s (Douglas') unfavorable
earnings expectations to customers who were institutional investors. Id. These large investors
sold Douglas shares either from existing holdings or made short sales totalling approximately
one-half of all Douglas shares sold on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) during the period
of nondisclosure. Id.
61. Id. at 232-33.
62. Id. at 233. The Merrill Lynch plaintiffs sued on behalf of all persons who purchased
Douglas shares during the period between the time the defendants learned the nonpublic informa-
tion and the time of public disclosure. Id.
63. Id. at 238; supra note 12 (discussion of "disclose or abstain" rule).
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with the deterrent purpose of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. 65 The Second Cir-
cuit, therefore, affirmed the district court's denial of the defendants' motion
to dismiss, leaving open the question of how to measure damages. 6
Two extreme views on the measure of damages in private insider trading
actions appear in the Sixth Circuit's decision in Fridrich v. Bradford.67 In
Fridrich, defendant J. C. Bradford, Jr. (Bradford) purchased shares in Old
Line Life Insurance Company (Old Line) on a tip from Bradford's father,
who was a director of Old Line, that Old Line had become the target of a
corporate takeover plan.68 After public disclosure of the takeover attempt in-
creased the price of Old Line stock, Bradford sold his Old Line shares at a
profit of thirteen thousand dollars. 6 The SEC required Bradford to disgorge
the thirteen thousand dollar profit, and three plaintiffs subsequently brought
a private suit seeking damages for lost profits.7" The Fridrich plaintiffs had
sold Old Line shares during the period when Bradford was buying the stock
on the basis of inside information.7' The United States District Court for the
Middle District of Tennessee held Bradford liable to all three plaintiffs for
a total of over three hundred thousand dollars. 72 Concluding that Bradford's
inside trading violated rule 10b-5, the district court reasoned that the plaintiff
investors' remedy should place the plaintiffs in approximately the same posi-
tion the plaintiffs would have occupied if no fraudulent conduct had occurred.
7
1
The district court, therefore, measured Bradford's damages as the difference
between the price at which each plaintiff sold Old Line shares and the highest
price that Old Line stock reached within a reasonable time after disclosure
of the takeover plans.
74
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the district court's finding
of liability and reversed. 75 The Sixth Circuit determined that Bradford's con-
64. 495 F.2d at 240; see Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54
(1972) (disclosure duty coupled with materiality of undisclosed facts establishes requisite causa-
tion for recovery).
65. See 495 F.2d at 240 (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847-48
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971)).
66. 459 F.2d at 241. The Merrill Lynch court recognized the possibility of awarding im-
mense damages to a large plaintiff class, and suggested that placing a limitation on the amount
of recovery might be proper. See id. at 242 (possibility of very substantial damages necessitates
district court discretion).
67. 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
68. Id. at 309-10.
69. Id. at 311.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 308. In Bradford, the plaintiffs sued five defendants, including J.C. Brad-
ford, Jr. (Bradford). See id. at 309 n.4 (defendants were two individuals and three companies).
Bradford's liability to the plaintiffs for over $300,000 on a $13,000 profit was joint and several
with the other defendants. See id. at 308. The Sixth Circuit noted that Bradford's $300,000 liability
was not dependent on the amount of Bradford's profit. Id. at 308-09.
73. See Fridrich v. Bradford, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fan. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 94,723,
at 96,408 (M.D. Tenn. 1974), rev'd, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
74. Id., at 96,406-07.
75. 542 F.2d at 309.
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duct did not cause the plaintiffs' injury because the plaintiffs sold their shares
on an impersonal stock exchange. 76 The Fridrich court reasoned that Brad-
ford's inside trading did not affect the plaintiffs' decision to sell their Old
Line stock.77 Noting that Bradford did not purchase any Old Line shares direct-
ly from the plaintiffs, the Sixth Circuit concluded that to hold Bradford liable
would overextend the reach of rule 10b-5.
78
In contrast to the all or nothing approaches in the Fridrich case, the Second
Circuit adopted a compromise measure of damages for inside traders in a
private action in Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc.79 In Elkind, two corporate
officers of Liggett & Myers, Inc. (Liggett) disclosed to financial analysts that
Liggett's earnings would decline." The informed analysts tipped this infor-
mation to several clients, who sold Liggett shares on the NYSE before the
unfavorable information became public.8' An investor who had purchased
Liggett shares before public disclosure of the earnings decline brought a class
action suit on behalf of all investors who purchased Liggett shares during the
period of nondisclosure."2 The United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York held Liggett liable to all plaintiffs who purchased Liggett
shares between the time of the tips to the analysts and the time of public
disclosure. 83 The district court fixed damages at the difference between the
price all plaintiffs paid for the Liggett shares and the market price of the shares
at a reasonable time after the public disclosure." The Second Circuit reversed
this damages measure, stating that to hold the company liable for full damages
to all plaintiffs would impose too harsh a penalty on the innocent shareholders
of the corporation." The Elkind court also stated that full recovery for plain-
tiffs who bought shares on an impartial exchange would be unfair because
open market stock traders have no absolute right to inside information. 86 The
Elkind court held, therofore, that plaintiffs should recover the difference be-
tween purchase price and postdisclosure market price only up to the amount
of loss the inside sellers would have sustained had the sellers retained their
76. Id. at 318-19. The Bradford court disagreed with the causation analysis in Shapiro v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. Id. at 319; see supra text accompanying notes 56-66
(discussion of Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.). See generally Rapp, Fridrich
v. Bradford and the Scope of Insider Trading Liability Under SEC Rule l0b-5: A Commentary,
38 OHIo ST. L.J. 67, 80-87 (1977) (discussion of conflict between Bradford and Shapiro v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. decisions).
77. 542 F.2d at 318.
78. See id. at 309 (imposing liability would constitute unwarranted extension of rule 10b-5).
79. 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980); see Note, New Measure of Damages, supra note 55, at
407-13 (discussion of Elkind); Note, Impersonal Market Context, supra note 55, at 106-10 (ex-
amining Elkins court's reasoning); Comment, Measure of Damages, supra note 55, at 142-47
(discussion of Elkind decision).
80. See 635 F.2d at 160-61.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 158.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 170.
86. Id. at 169-70.
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shares until public disclosure.8 7 The Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs
would share the recovery pro rata. 8
The Elkind court recognized that pro rata recovery provided little incen-
tive for private enforcement of the insider trading prohibitions. 9 Other courts
also have noted that the disgorgement remedy does not fulfill adequately the
congressional purpose of deterring insider trading. 90 In an effort to provide
more stringent measures against insider trading, Congress presently is con-
sidering the Insider Trading Sanctions Act (ITSA).9' ITSA would allow the
SEC to exact treble damages from inside traders, thereby increasing the risk
an insider must face when deciding whether to trade on the basis of material
nonpublic information.
92
Congress already had recognized the need for more extreme punitive
measures in two federal statutes which currently employ the treble damages
penalty. 93 Section four of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 94 for example, authorizes
private plaintiffs to collect treble damages from defendants who violate the
87. Id. at 173.
88. Id. The Elkind court examined three possible damages measures before deciding upon
a limited pro rata disgorgement measure. See id. at 170-72. The court first considered the tradi-
tional out-of-pocket measure which would compensate each plaintiff fully for the difference be-
tween the price paid and the true value of the stock. See id. at 170. The Elkind court rejected
this measure because of problems in proving true value and because the resulting sum would
be exorbitant. Id. The Elkind court next considered a market repercussion approach, which would
compensate plaintiffs only for the decline in market price directly attributable to the insider's
trading. See id. at 171. The court rejected this measure because of the impossibility of proving
to what extent a stock's decline was the result of insider selling and not other factors. Id. The
Elkind court finally settled upon the third alternative, which would allow plaintiffs to recover
the postpurchase decline in market price within a reasonable time after disclosure up to the amount
of loss that the insider avoided by selling before disclosure. Id. at 172. See generally, Note, New
Measure of Damages, supra note 55, at 414-16 (discussion of damages measure rejected in Elkind);
Note, Impersonal Market Context, supra note 55, at 111-18 (analysis of Elkind alternative damages
measures); Comment, Measure of Damages, supra note 55, at 147-51 (discussion of Elkind and
possible damages measures).
89. See 635 F.2d at 173 (pro rata recovery could be inadequate to make class action
worthwhile).
90. See SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 56 (1st Cir. 1983) (Coffin, C.J., dissenting in
part) (disgorgement is inadequate deterrent to insider trading); SEC v. Randolph, 564 F. Supp.
137, 141 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (mere disgorgement has little deterrent effect).
91. H.R. 559, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (Insider Trading Sanctions Act (ITSA)). The
United States House of Representatives passed ITSA on September 19, 1983, and ITSA currently
is before the Senate. 41 U.S. CONG. Q. 1970 (Sept. 24, 1983); see The Wall Street Journal, Mar.
2, 1984, at 12, col. 6 (discussion of ITSA). The future of ITSA, however, is uncertain. See Brunelle,
supra note 25, at 372 (special interest lobbies may block passage of ITSA).
92. See H.R. 559, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. § 2 (1983) (ITSA treble damage section); SEC
Memorandum, supra note 16, H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1983) (treble damages
would pose greater risk to inside traders).
93. See infra note 94, 96, and text accompanying notes 94-97 (discussion of Clayton Act
and Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) treble damage provisions).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982) (Clayton Act, § 4). Section 4 of the Clayton Act superseded
the original antitrust treble damages provision in § 7 of the Sherman Act, Act of July 2, 1890,
ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 210 (1890) (repealed). Congress derived the idea of treble damages for
antitrust violations from an early English monopolies statute. See 21 Jac., ch. 3 (1623) (English
statute provided treble damages for individuals financially injured by restraint of trade). Con-
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antitrust laws. 95 In addition, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act (RICO) 96 provides for a civil treble damages remedy. 97 ITSA, which
bestows only the SEC with a right of action, contrasts with the Clayton Act
and RICO provisions empowering private plaintiffs to seek redress for statutory
violations. 98
RICO allows private plaintiffs to recover treble damages by demonstrating
that a defendant has committed two acts of racketeering activity within ten
years.99 Section I(1)(D)' °° of RICO includes securities fraud within the statutory
gress intended the treble damages remedy to encourage private plaintiffs to enforce the antitrust
laws. See W. HAMILTON & J. TiLL, ANTITRusT iN AcTioN 10 (US. Temporary National Economic
Committee Monograph No. 16, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1940), quoted in H.
THORELU, THE FEDERAL ANrRusT PoLIcY 229 n.169 (1954) (Congress intended treble damages
clause to make worthwhile policing of industry by injured members). See generally K. ELZ1NGA
& W. BRtrr, Tan ANTI= UST PENALTmS: A STuDY iN LAw AND ECONOMCS 63-77 (1976) (discus-
sion of background of private antitrust treble damages penalty).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
96. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982) (RICO). RICO is title IX of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (OCCA). Congress enacted RICO to curb
the influence of organized crime on legitimate business enterprises. See Harper v. New Japan
Sec. Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1004 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (RICO seeks to curb infiltration of
legitimate businesses by members of organized crime); H.R. RP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4007, 4010 (1970) (legislative history
of OCCA and RICO). RICO provides for the recovery of treble damages by private plaintiffs.
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). Like the antitrust treble damages clause, the availability of RICO
civil treble damages facilitates private enforcement of RICO's statutory provision. See Blakey
& Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal
and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1048 (1980) (RICO's civil remedies part of broadly
based legislative attack); Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial Restric-
tion, 95 HAgv. L. REv. 1101, 1112-13 (1982) (congressional purpose for RICO treble damages
is to inflict financial injury on criminals). See generally Bradley, Racketeers, Congress, and the
Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65 IowA L. REv. 837, 838-45 (1980) (discussion of history and
background of RICO).
97. 18 U.S.C.-§ 1964(c) (1982).
98. See H.R. 559, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. § 2 (1983) (ITSA treble damages provision for
benefit of SEC). In addition to conferring a right of action for treble damages on private plain-
tiffs, the Clayton Act and RICO allow private plaintiffs to recover costs and attorneys' fees.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (c) (1982) (RICO costs and attorneys' fees); 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982) (Clayton
Act costs and attorneys' fees). ITSA does not provide for costs or attorneys' fees in SEC treble
damages actions. See H.R. 599, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1983) (ITSA does not mention costs
or attorneys' fees). But see 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982) ('34 Act provides that no costs be assessed
for or against SEC); FED. R. Crv. P. 54(d) (no costs allowed against government agency unless
authorized by statute).
99. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-62, 64 (1982). Section two of RICO makes unlawful any pattern
of racketeering activity or the use of funds derived from a pattern of racketeering activity in
any enterprise affecting interstate commerce. Id. at § 1962. Section one of RICO defines a pat-
tern of racketeering activity as two acts of racketeering activity occurring within ten years, the
first act having occurred since enactment of the statute. Id. § 1961(5). Section one further lists
various predicate acts which fall within the definition of racketeering activity and trigger the
application of § 2. Id. § 1961(1). Section four of RICO authorizes private plaintiffs to collect
treble damages plus costs and attorneys' fees for injury sustained by reason of a violation of
§ 2. Id. § 1964(c). Section four also provides for divestiture and injunctive relief. Id. § 1964(a).
Section three contains RICO's criminal penalty provisions. Id. § 1963.
100. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D) (1982).
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definition of racketeering activity.'"' A split of authority exists, however, over
the general applicability of RICO to securities fraud claims.' 2 Some courts
have held that Congress intended RICO to apply only to securities transactions
involving organized crime, and thus ordinary securities claims do not qualify
for RICO treble damages.0 3 Other courts have suggested, however, that Con-
gress intended the judiciary to construe RICO's remedial measures liberally,
thus rendering even ordinary violators of the securities laws liable for RICO
treble damages. 0 4 While no private plaintiff has yet recovered treble damages
for insider trading under RICO, the Second Circuit recently considered a RICO
treble damages claim brought by a private investor against inside traders in
Moss v. Morgan Stanley.'
101. Id.
102. See infra notes 103-04 and accompanying text (discussion of different court interpreta-
tions of RICO's securities fraud provision); see also Coffield, If RICO is Applied to Securities
Fraud, Can Antitrust Be Far Behind?, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 379, 379-80 & n.4 (1983) (RICO's
broad sweep threatens preemption of federal securities fraud law); MacIntosh, Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act: Powerful New Tool of the Defrauded Securities Plaintiff, 31
U. KAN. L. REv. 7, 14-67 (1982) (discussion of unresolved issues in RICO securities fraud litiga-
tion); Note, RICO and Securities Fraud: A Workable Limitation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1513, 1522-26
(1983) (application of RICO in ordinary securities litigation is improper) [hereinafter cited as
RICO and Securities Fraud]; Note, Application of The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tion Act (RICO) to Securities Violations, 8 J. Co"P. L. 411, 437 (1983) (illustration of judicial
conflict in interpreting proper breadth of RICO applicability to securities fraud claims) [hereinafter
cited as RICO Securities Violations].
103. See Noonan v. Granville-Smith, 537 F. Supp. 23, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (court dismissed
RICO securities fraud counts for failure to allege connection with organized crime); Adair v.
Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 747 (N.D. 111. 1981) (application of RICO limited
to entities involved with organized crime); cf. Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc.,
527 F. Supp. 256, 260 (E.D. La. 1981) (court dismissed RICO antitrust claim for failure to show
nexus with organized crime); Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 113 (ordinary mail fraud
claim not within RICO absent connection with organized crime). Courts have used other criteria
besides the lack of connection with organized crime to narrow the scope of RICO civil liability.
See, e.g., Harper v. New Japan Sec. Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1007 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (predicate
securities violation alone not sufficient showing of injury by reason of RICO violation); Land-
mark Say. & Loan v. Rhoades, 527 F. Supp. 206, 209 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (memorandum opinion)
(mere showing of securities violation without more not sufficient to recover RICO treble damages).
See generally Note, RICO and Securities Fraud, supra note 102, at 1526-34 (discussion of judicial
attempts to narrow RICO); Note, RICO Securities Violations, supra note 102, at 417-436 (description
of judicial use of enterprise, organized crime, and injury requirements to restrict scope of RICO).
104. See, e.g., Moss v. Morgan Stanley, [Current Binder] FE). SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,478,
at 96,762 & n.17 (2d Cir. 1983) (dictum) (neither language of statute nor legislative history man-
dates connection with organized crime); Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 457
(7th Cir.) (dictum) (RICO forbids penetration of business by racketeering activity with or without
involvement of organized crime), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 177 (1982); Mauriber v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 391, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (dictum) (RICO does not require allegation
of organized crime connection); Farmers Bank v. Bell Mtg. Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278, 1280 (D.
Del. 1978) (RICO gives rise to treble damages remedy for ordinary securities fraud); cf. United
States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 303 (7th Cir. 1979) (no organized crime connection required
in criminal burglary RICO action), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980). See generally Note, RICO
and Securities Fraud, supra note 102, at 1517-20 (RICO applies to corporate takeover battles).
105. [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,478 (2d Cir. 1983).
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In Moss, an investment analyst disclosed nonpublic information concern-
ing an impending corporate tender offer to a stockbroker named Newman."°6
Newman purchased shares in the target company on the NYSE and tendered
the shares to the offering corporation at a substantial profit.'0 7 A private plain-
tiff who had sold target company shares before the offer became public sued
Newman and the investment analyst for violating section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.0 0
The plaintiff also tried to recover treble damages from Newman under RICO. '° 9
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dis-
missed the plaintiff's complaint, holding that Newman had no duty to disclose
inside information because no fiduciary relationship existed between Newman
and the plaintiff."I0 The district court found, therefore, that the plaintiffs had
no standing to sue Newman for violations of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5."'
Furthermore, the district court dismissed the RICO claim by declaring that
RICO's civil remedies do not apply to ordinary securities law violations." '
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of
the private action." 3 The Second Circuit, however, disagreed with the district
court's view concerning RICO's applicability to securities fraud claims." 4 The
Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the RICO claim on the ground that
the plaintiff's failure to show a violation of section 10(b) or rule lOb-5
necessarily precluded any assertion of RICO securities fraud."I5 The Moss court
stated in dictum, however, that a valid showing of ordinary securities fraud
could satisfy RICO's pleading prerequisite, and thereby enable a private plain-
106. See id. at 96,751. In Moss, Warner-Lambert Company (Warner) planned to make a
tender offer for Deseret Pharmaceutical Company (Deseret). Id. Warner employed the invest-
ment banking firm of Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc. (Morgan Stanley) to analyze Deseret's stock
and determine an appropriate tender offer price for Deseret's shares. Id. An analyst employee
of Morgan Stanley familiar with Warner's plans to acquire Deseret advised an acquaintance to
purchase Deseret stock. Id. The acquaintance informed stockbroker Newman, who purchased
shares for himself, the analyst, and the analyst's acquaintance. Id. The plaintiff brought a class
action on behalf of all selling shareholders against Morgan Stanley as well as the three individual
defendants, seeking RICO treble damages for violations of section 10(b) and rule lob-5. Id. at
96,751-52. The plaintiff's appeal from the district court's dismissal of all RICO claims applied
only to the claim against Newman. Id. at 96,752 n.4.
107. Id. at 96,751.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 96,752, see supra note 106 (plaintiff appealed dismissal of RICO claims against
all defendants only as applied to Newman).
110. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1352-53 (S.D.N.Y.) (defendants
owed no disclosure duty to plaintiffs), aff'd [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. Rin'. (CCH) 99,478
(2d Cir. 1983); see also Dirks v. SEC, 103 S.Ct. 3255, 3261 (1983) (no disclosure duty exists
in absence of fiduciary relationship); United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 232-33 & n.14
(mere acquisition of information does not create disclosure duty).
111. 553 F. Supp. at 1353.
112. See id. at 1361 (RICO should apply only to organized crime); see also supra note 103
(cases holding that connection with organized crime is necessary prerequisite to RICO claims).
113. Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., [Current Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 99,478,
at 96,763 (2d Cir. 1983).
114. See id. at 96,763.
115. Id.
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tiff to qualify for RICO treble damages in an insider trading action."16
The prospect of a treble damages penalty would present a much stronger
deterrent to insider trading than current sanctions provide. 117 The two goals
underlying the present statutory treble damages remedies are deterrence and
compensation.' The deterrence theory supports the multiplication of damages
on the assumption that the violator has broken the law before or will break
the law again with impunity.' 9 Applying a multiplier to actual damages will
deter potential violators from trying to profit by illegal conduct on the chance
that they likely can avoid prosecution.2 0 Dividing the actual damage measure
by the probability of prosecution will yield the appropriate damage multiplier.' 2'
Given the current perception that much insider trading goes undetected and
unpunished, the deterrence theory of multiple damages supports the proposal
for treble damages under ITSA.' 2
Compensation is the second reason for applying a multiplier to actual
damages.' 2 3 Awarding an injured plaintiff a sum of money greater than the
economic injury incurred compensates the plaintiff for the costs and loss of
productivity involved in litigating the suit. 2 Additionally, awarding multiple
116. See id. at 96,759 & n.13 (dictum) (allegations of ordinary securities fraud can qualify
for RICO claims); supra note 104 (cases holding that no organized crime connection is necessary
for RICO liability).
117. See SEC Memorandum, supra note 16, at 24-25 (multiple civil penalty would present
powerful deterrent to insider trading); supra notes 17, 90 and accompanying text (current remedies
have little deterrent effect).
118. See R. PostNr & F. EASTERBROOK, ATrrRusT CASaS, EcoNowc NOTES, AND OmER
MATRAis 542-45 (1981) (discussion of redress for victims and deterrence as goals of private
enforcement of antitrust laws); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, AN EcoNoMIc PERSPECTrVE 221
(1976) (deterrence and compensation are basic objectives of antitrust remedial system); see also
Harper v. New Japan Sec. Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1007 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (analogy to
antitrust law is most logical way to interpret RICO treble damages clause).
119. Sed R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 118, at 552 (multiple damages make
up for undetected violations); R. PosNER, EcoNoMIc ANALYisS OF Lmw, 360 (1972) (multiple damages
are proper when detection of violation is less than certain).
120. See R. PosNER & F. EASTEnROOK, supra note 118, at 552 (multiple damages are necessary
to make potential violators foresee unprofitability of illegal conduct); R. POSNER, supra note
119, at 360 (multiple damages make potential violators realize that costs of violation will exceed
benefits); R. POSNER, supra note 118, at 221 (greater costs attached to violation will deter activity).
121. R. PosNER & F. EASTERBRooK, supra note 118, at 552; R. POSNER, supra note 119,
at 360; R. POSNER, supra note 118, at 223-24.
122. See SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 56 (1st Cir. 1983) (Coffin, C.J., dissenting) (risk
of detection of insider trading is less than 100%); cf. Brunelle, supra note 25, at 371 & nn.4,6
(inside traders stand little chance of detection). The great difficulties involved in gathering suffi-
cient proof to support a conviction makes the likelihood of detecting and punishing insider trading
violations especially small. See The Wall Street Journal, Mar. 2, 1984, at 12, col 5 (tracking
insider trading involves circumstantial evidence problems).
123. See R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 118, at 542 (discussion of compensation
goal). Posner regards the compensation goal as secondary to that of deterrence. See R. POSNER,
supra note 118, at 221 (well-designed deterrence system would assure adequate compensation
as byproduct).
124. See R. POSNER & F. EAsmaaRooK, supra note 118, at 543 (plaintiffs will sue only if
recovery is worth costs of suit).
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damages encourages private plaintiffs to enforce the statutory prohibitions.' 2 s
Since ITSA would provide only for the SEC and not private plaintiffs to col-
lect treble damages, the private enforcement rationale does not apply.'2 6 Because
ITSA would make treble damages awards payable into the United States
Treasury, however, the proceeds of successful ITSA suits could "compensate"
the government for the costs of funding SEC enforcement activities.' 7 The
funding of SEC enforcement through treble damages awards in turn could
further the goal of deterrence by providing additional funding for expansion
of enforcement capabilities.' 8
Some commentators in the antitrust field have attacked treble damages
as being inefficient and unfair.' 9 Proponents of the inefficiency argument
against antitrust treble damages also assert that private enforcement is not
proper. 30 Commentators discussing inefficiency argue that allowing treble
damages encourages consumers to deal with violators rather than nonviolators
in order to attain standing to assert treble damages claims.' 31 Furthermore,
the punitive aspect of treble damages encourages plaintiffs to bring nuisance
suits in attempting to obtain out of court settlements from defendants who
would rather bear a certain small loss than incur the costs of litigation and
risk the possibility of an adverse judgment.'32 Finally, economic inefficiency
results when excessive sums of money flow into litigation costs and courts
become congested with private enforcement actions.' 33 Proponents of the in-
125. Id.; see supra note 94 (Congress foresaw private treble damages as aid to enforcement
of antitrust laws). See generally Landes & Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEoAL
SmTrums 1, 30-44 (1975) (discussion of positive economic implications of private law enforcement).
126. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (ITSA does not apply to private plaintiffs).
127. Cf. Note, Damages to Uninformed Traders for Insider Trading on Impersonal Exchanges,
74 COLUM. L. Rav. 299, 316 (1974) (proposing that SEC receive benefit of disgorged profits)
[hereinafter cited as Uninformed Traders].
128. See id. (disgorged profits could fund special SEC insider trading enforcement unit).
129. See K. EmZNGA & W. BRarr, supra note 94, at 84-96 (attacking treble damages as inef-
ficient); 2 P. AREEDA & P. TtRNER, ANTrTRUsT LAw 331(b) (1978) (attacking treble damages
as unfair to defendants). See generally Sullivan, Breaking Up the Treble Play: Attacks on the
Private Treble Damage Antitrust Action, 14 SEroN HALL L. REV. 17, 25-67 (1983) (summary
of and defenses to arguments against treble damages).
130. See K. ELziNGA & W. BRrr, supra note 94, at 112 (private enforcement has adverse
side effects); infra notes 131-34 and accompanying text (discussion of adverse side effects of private
enforcement); cf. infra note 150 (discussion of arguments against private actions for insider trading).
131. See K. ELZINGA & W. BIarr, supra note 94, at 84-90 (prospect of treble damages magnifies
consumer's incentive to deal with antitrust violator). Elzinga and Breit note that inefficiency results
from allowing treble damages because consumers deliberately will continue to incur greater losses
in order to magnify the forthcoming reparations. Id. at 84. But see Sullivan, supra note 129,
at 32 (tort and contract doctrines of mitigation of damages deny recovery to plaintiffs who
deliberately incur loss).
132. See K. ELziNGA & W. BRarr, supra note 94, at 90-95 (discussion of groundless claims
brought in hopes of recovering from defendants who prefer to avoid trial); see also R. PosNmR
& F. EAmERBROOK, supra note 118, at 544 (treble damages lead to overenforcement). But see
Sullivan, supra note 129, at 40 (discussion of plaintiff considerations that make nuisance suits
unlikely).
133. See K. ELziNGA & W. BRarr, supra note 94, at 95 (private treble damage actions involve
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efficiency argument, therefore, assert that public enforcement with fines for
penalties would be more economically efficient than private enforcement with
treble damages awards.
3 4
Proponents of the unfairness argument against treble damages in antitrust
law assert that courts should have discretion to award less than treble damages
when the harm caused by a defendant's conduct does not merit harsh
punishment. 3- ITSA would permit this degree of discretion by allowing courts
to impose up to three times the amount of damages. 3 6 The harm that ITSA
treble damages seek to prevent is injury to the integrity of the stock exchanges
as a whole. 31 Some insider trading violations will present a less severe threat
to market integrity than others. '" Courts in these circumstances could require
mere disgorgement of profits or impose some other damages measure less than
treble damages."3
The concept of injury to market integrity as a basis for deterring insider
trading, however, has met with criticism from the standpoint of economic
efficiency. 140 Some commentators on insider trading have argued that insider
trading is efficient and should not be illegal. 4' 1 These commentators assert
that insider trading fulfills the purpose of securities legislation by providing
more prompt disclosure of information that affects the value of stock in the
complicated litigation strategies that congest federal courts); R. PosNER, supra note 118, at 228
(private plaintiffs' lawyers lack self restraint).
134. See K. ELziNGA & W. BRrr, supra note 94, at 112-38 (discussion of public enforcement
with fines as more efficient alternative to private enforcement); cf. infra note 150 (discussion
of arguments against private actions for insider trading).
135. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 129, 331(b) (treble damages are punitive
and not all violations deserve punitive damages); see also Sullivan, supra note 129, at 53-67 (sum-
mary of and defense to unfairness argument against treble damages). Congress has considered
making antitrust treble damages discretionary but has not done so. See id. at 54 & nn.180-82
(discussion of congressional hearings on antitrust laws); see also K. ELZiNOA & W. BRErr, supra
note 94, at 65 & n.10.
136. H.R. 599, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1983); see SEC Memorandum, supra note 16,
at 26 (ITSA does not mandate maximum penalty in every case).
137. See SEC Memorandum, supra note 16, at 22-23 (ITSA seeks to protect public con-
fidence in securities markets).
138. Compare Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 232
(2d Cir. 1974) (institutional investors in possession of material nonpublic information sold large
blocks of company shares totaling one half of all company shares sold on NYSE during period)
with SEC v. Randolph, 564 F. Supp. 137, 139 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (insider tipped information to
father-in-law who profited on purchase of 65 call options).
139. See SEC Memorandum, supra note 16, at 26 (amount of penalty under ITSA would
depend on facts and circumstances of each case).
140. See infra notes 141-45 and accompanying text (discussion of arguments in defense of
insider trading).
141. See H. MANNE, INSmER TRADING AND I STOCK MARKET at v-vi (1966) (objective
economic analysis without regard to moral judgment reveals that insider trading may have positive
social and economic influence); Carlton & Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN.
L. REv. 857, 861-95 (1983) (analysis of arguments against insider trading and conclusion that
insider trading is beneficial and efficient form of managerial compensation). But see Schotland,
Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REv.
1425, 1430-74 (1967) (refuting arguments in favor of insider trading).
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market. ' 2 As stock prices respond to buying or selling by insiders, the in-
vesting public receives a signal that some new development affecting the value
of the firm may have occurred.' 43 Such signals could alert the investing public
far in advance of the time that a corporation would deem prudent for public
disclosure. '14 Furthermore, the commentators defending insider trading argue




In addition to conflicting views over insider trading's harmfulness to market
integrity and the investing public, a controversy exists over who among private
investors sustains injury from insider trading.' 4 6 Whenever an insider deals
directly with a private investor, ordinary principles of common-law fraud apply
to justify imposing liability on the inside trader.'4 1 In transactions on imper-
142. See infra notes 143-44 and accompanying text (insider trading facilitates prompt dissemina-
tion of information).
143. See H. MNaN, supra note 141, at 77-110 (analysis of insider trading effects on market
prices); Carlton & Fischel, supra note 141, at 868 (insider trading causes price movements that
convey information to investors); cf. Dooley, supra note 16, at I (increase in volume of shares
traded supports inference of insider trading).
144. See H. MANN,, supra note 141, at 104-05 (insider trading could convey information
that corporate interest would delay); Carlton & Fischel, supra note 141, at 868 (public announce-
ment could destroy value to corporation of information that insider trading could convey); see
also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969). In Texas Gulf Sulphur, Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. (TGS) discovered valuable mineral deposits
in Timmins, Ontario in November of 1963. Id. at 843-44. TGS did not acquire mineral rights
to the land, however, until April of 1964. See H. MANa, supra at 105 (discussion of Texas
Gulf Sulphur). Disclosure of the discovery would have made the ultimate acquisition of mineral
rights much more expensive. Id.; see 401 F.2d at 850 n.12 (delay in disclosure served valid business
purpose). Insider trading by TGS officials, however, caused a significant increase in the market
price of TGS shares well before disclosure occurred in April. See id. at 840 n.2 (tabulation of
stock purchases by insiders showing increase in share prices). Manne acknowledges, however,
that in some instances the allowance of insider trading would result in delay of corporate disclosure.
See H. MAuNe, supra, at 104 (insiders need time to exploit value of nonpublic information);
see also Schotland, supra note 141, at 1148 (allowing insider trading would result in improper
delay of disclosure).
145. See H. MANNE, supra note 141, at 131-45 (discussion of inside information as compen-
sation to corporate officers); Carlton & Fischel, supra note 141, at 861 (allowing insider trading
can be efficient form of compensation). Proponents of the compensation argument in favor of
insider trading assert that possession of information is a property right that business firms should
assign to the most economically efficient user. Id. at 863. Firms must choose to assign this right
either to the firm's investors or to the firm's officers. Id. Firms generally assign the information
rights to managers because firms and society realize a greater economic benefit from managers'
use of information than from investors'. See id. at 866-72 (managerial rather than shareholder
use of inside information provides greater economic benefit).
146. See infra notes 147-52 and accompanying text (discussion of developing law in private
insider trading actions).
147. See Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). In Strong, the defendant purchased the
plaintiff's minority interest in a corporation owning nearly worthless land in the Phillipines while
in possession of nonpublic knowledge that the United States government soon would purchase
the land. Id. at 421-27. The defendant was a director and 75% owner of the corporation and
conducted negotiations with the government for the sale of the land. Id. at 431-32. The defendant
effected the purchase by means of an agent who did not disclose the defendant as principal.
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sonal market exchanges, however, the questions of causation and privity become
more complex. '4 ' The general trend has been for courts to relax the common-
law standards of causation and privity in order to find an inside trader liable
to private plaintiffs who dealt on impersonal exchanges.' 49 The Supreme Court,
however, has exhibited a tendency to limit the class of private plaintiffs who
could qualify for damages from inside traders. 5 ' The Court has held that
the existence of a fiduciary relationship between the inside trader and the cor-
poration's shareholders is an essential prerequisite to liability for insider
trading.151 This restriction on the availability of private actions frustrates the
SEC's position that private enforcement is a needed supplemental deterrent
to insider trading.
52
ITSA treble damages would serve the SEC's goal of deterring insider
trading. 53 ITSA addresses the insider trading problem from the standpoint
of public enforcement against activity that Congress views as harmful to the
public interest.' 54 In this way, ITSA would provide an efficient enforcement
Id. at 432. After the government purchased the land, the shares increased tenfold in value. See
id. at 426. The Supreme Court held that under these facts the defendant incurred a duty to disclose
before trading, and the defendant's trading without disclosure was fraud. Id. at 434. The Strong
Court held that the defendant's fraud was the cause of the plaintiffs injury and ordered restitu-
tion of the shares. See id. at 434-35 (defendant's fraudulent conduct caused plaintiff's injury);
id. at 422 (restitution order that Supreme Court affirmed). See generally H. MANNE, supra note
141, at 21-22 (discussion of Strong v. Repide).
148. See Note, Uninformed Traders, supra note 127, at 306-15 (discussion of causation and
privity problems); Note, Impersonal Market Context, supra note 55, at 98 (causation and privity
are difficult to show in market transactions). Causation is absent from impersonal market trans-
actions because each investor would have traded regardless of the presence of any insiders in
the market, and privity is absent because no investor knows who owned the same shares bought
and sold. Id.; see Note, Uninformed Traders, supra note 127, at 306. See generally Wang, Trading
on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who Is Harmed, and Who
Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 10b-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 1217, 1230-40, 1248-1311 (1981)
(detailed explanation of how stock market works and difficulty of applying causation and privity
standards to stock market transactions).
149. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 239
(2d Cir. 1974) (plaintiffs need not show privity in lOb-5 actions); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 446 F.2d 90, 101 (10th Cir.) (common-law privity does not apply to rule lob-5 actions),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1291
(2d Cir. 1969) (common-law fraud elements not essential to show securities acts violations).
150. See infra note 151 and accompanying text. Some commentators have advocated com-
plete abolishment of the private right of action for insider trading. See Note, Uninformed Traders,
supra note 127, at 318 (suggesting elimination of private recovery for market transactions and
leaving enforcement to SEC); Note, Limiting the Plaintiff Class: Rule 10b-5 and the Federal
Securities Code, 72 MicH. L. Rev. 1398, 1429 (1974) (private remedies do not further goals behind
§ 10(b) and rule lOb-5).
151. See Dirks v. SEC, 103 S.Ct. 3255, 3261 (1983) (fiduciary relationship necessary to im-
pose disclosure duty); United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 232-33 (1980) (no disclosure duty
arises without fiduciary relationship).
152. See supra note 15 (SEC supports private actions for added deterrence).
153. See SEC Memorandum, supra note 16, at 24-25 (multiple damages would pose power-
ful deterrent to insider trading).
154. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (ITSA for benefit of SEC not private plain-
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mechanism to the SEC while leaving the dispute over the need for private
remedies to the courts.'" While the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the
conflict between the circuits over the propriety of extending private insider
trading liability to impersonal market transactions, the Court's inclination away
from private enforcement is apparent. 56 Yet, a general perception persists that
insider trading is unfair, and current deterrent measures have proven
inadequate.'- 7 ITSA, therefore, properly supplies additional deterrent power
to the public enforcement authorities while declining to address the private
enforcement issue.
JERRY EDWARD FARMER
tiffs); supra note 137 and accompanying text (Congress considers insider trading harmful to public's
interest in market integrity).
155. See supra notes 146-52 and accompanying text (discussion of private actions against
inside traders).
156. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text (discussion of Supreme Court limita-
tions on private actions); supra notes 56-78 and accompanying text (Shapiro and Fridrich deci-
sions illustrate Second and Sixth Circuits' disagreement about extending liability for market
transactions).
157. See Brunelle, supra note 25, at 371 (disgorgement remedy is useless); Langevoort, In-
sider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1,
2 (1982) (insider trading prohibitions founded on strong intuition of unfairness).
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